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Accomplice Testimony and Credibility: "Vouching"
and Prosecutorial Abuse of Agreements
to Testify Truthfully
L

INTRODUCTION

Criminal prosecutors often are faced with the difficult task
of persuading a jury to believe the testimony of a defendant's
accomplices or of other informants.' Such testimony is inherently less reliable than that of other witnesses, 2 but because a
successful prosecution may depend upon accomplice or informant testimony, prosecutors often offer these witnesses plea or
immunity agreements in order to secure their testimony. As a
part of such agreements, the prosecutor will usually require the
witnesses to promise to testify truthfully at trial.3 Prosecutors
will use this promise to rehabilitate a witness whose credibility
has been called into question; the prosecutor will argue that
the witness should be believed because he or she would lose
the benefits of the bargain with the prosecution should he or
she fail to tell the truth at trial. 4 Although the prosecution is
1. Use of the testimony of accomplices and other informers is widespread.
See Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MmN. L. REV. 669, 679 & n.28 (1980).
Professor Nemerson notes that
[a]lthough prosecutors would undoubtedly prefer to present cases
against defendants on the testimony of religious leaders and others
whose credibility is not open to serious challenge, many offenses are of
such a nature that the only witnesses with compelling knowledge of incriminating facts are accomplices in the specific crime, or at least general criminal associates of the defendant.
Id. at 729 (footnote omitted).
Accomplices of defendants are competent witnesses, and in the federal
courts defendants may be found guilty on the uncorroborated testimony of
their accomplices. See United States v. Rosson, 441 F.2d 242, 244 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 843 (1971).
2. It is, of course, often in an accomplice's own interest to place guilt on
the defendant, either to shift blame from the accomplice or to comply with a
bargain that has been struck with the authorities. See United States v. Lee, 506
F.2d 111, 115 n.5, 118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1002 (1975). For a
discussion of accomplice testimony, see Comment, Accomplice Testimony
Under ConditionalPromise of Immunity, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 138, 139 (1952). Juries are often informed of the dangers accompanying accomplice testimony.
See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 506 F.2d 111, 118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1002 (1975) (cautionary instruction).
3. See note 8 infra.
4. If the plea bargain agreement is voided by failure to comply with all its
terms, the witness will again be subject to the original charges.
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justfied in attempting to convince the jury of the witness's credibility, there are serious objections to using the truthfulness
agreement to do so.
This Note will demonstrate that the use of truthfulness
agreements to bolster credibility is functionally equivalent to
prosecutorial "vouching"-an act that has been nearly unanimously labeled an abuse of the prosecutorial function by the
federal courts.5 The Note will then examine the ineffectiveness
of current efforts to curb vouching, and will discuss the obstacles to elimination of the abuse of agreements to testify truthfully. Viewing the abuse of truthfulness agreements in the
context of efforts to curb prosecutorial misconduct, 6 the Note
concludes that truthfulness agreements should be excluded
from evidence and that a per se rule of reversibility should be
invoked when a prosecutor uses an agreement to testify truthfully to bolster the credibility of a witness.
II.

AGREEMENTS TO TESTIFY TRUTHFULLY AND
PROSECUTORIAL VOUCHING

Plea bargains and immunity agreements are contracts between an individual and the government in which the government offers an inducement, such as a reduced charge or
immunity from prosecution, in return for a guilty plea or testimony.7 When testimony is the object of the agreement, the individual usually must promise to testify "fully and fairly" or
"truthfully." This truthfulness agreement becomes part of the
plea bargaining agreement, and if the witness does not testify
truthfully he or she may lose the benefits of the plea bargain.8
The entire plea or immunity agreement, including the
5. See notes 15 & 34 infra and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of other types of prosecutorial misconduct, see Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEx. L
REv. 629, 630-44 (1972).
7. The prosecutor has broad discretion in the formation of these agreements. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (plea bargains);
United States v. Hollinger, 553 F.2d 535, 548 (7th Cir. 1977) (immunity agreements). The prosecutor's discretion in forming plea agreements is not totally
without limitation, however. At least one court has reversed a conviction in
which a cooperation agreement was conditioned upon the defendant's indictment and conviction, finding testimony pursuant to such an agreement "impure, dubious, and tainted beyond redemption."' People v. Green, 102 Cal.
App. 2d 831, 839, 228 P.2d 867, 871-72 (1951). The inducements for the witness to
exaggerate testimony given such conditions are obvious. See Comment, supra
note 2, at 139.
8. For example, in United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1980),
the plea agreement provided that the witness would lose the benefits of his
agreement "should he at anytime testify untruthfully." Id. at 532. In United
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truthfulness agreement, may become relevant in judging the
credibility of bargained-for testimony. Because evidence that a
witness is testifying pursuant to a plea or immunity agreement
is relevant to the witness's credibility, 9 the details of the "deal"
probably will be elicited during cross examination. 0 During
this cross examination, and later during the closing argument,
defense counsel may attempt to discredit the witness by reminding the jury that the witness would say anything in order
to reap the benefits of the agreement." To rehabilitate the witness's credibility, the prosecution might turn to the truthfulness agreement-the existence of such an agreement arguably
makes it more probable that the witness is telling the truth.12
States v. Arroyo-Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978),
the cooperation agreement stated:
The understandings are that Mr. Rivas shall truthfully disclose all information with respect to the activities of himself and others concerning all matters about which this office inquires of him, and, further,
shall truthfully testify at any trial or other court of Grand Jury proceeding with respect to any matters about which this office may request his testimony.
If Mr. Rivas provides complete and truthful cooperation, he shall
not be prosecuted by the Federal Government or New York State authorities for charges based on information he has supplied to this office.
Id. at 1145 n.9. Such language is typical of plea agreement provisions.
9. See United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 535 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Goodman, 605 F.2d 870, 880 (5th Cir. 1979).
10. "The jury is entitled to consider and evaluate the interest that a witness may have as a consequence of a plea bargain." United States v. Rosson,
441 F.2d 242, 244 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 843 (1971). See also United
States v. Vida, 370 F.2d 759, 767 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 910 (1967).
In fact, it is serious error for the prosecutor not to disclose the existence of a
leniency agreement to the court and to defense counsel; such an action would,
in effect, constitute the concealment of relevant evidence from the defense-evidence relating to the witness's credibility. See United States v. Pope, 529 F.2d
112, 114 (9th Cir. 1976). It is not proper, however, for the prosecutor to introduce the plea bargaining agreement during direct examination. See United
States v. Arroyo-Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137, 1146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913
(1978). See also C. McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE, § 49, at 102 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
11. One defense attorney phrased his credibility argument in the following
manner
Put yourself in the position of Mr. Rivas. Put yourself in the position of
a man who is facing 20 years in jail, a man who looks forward to years
and years and years locked up in a cell, rather than doing what he
would want to do .... Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I ask you,
and you ask yourself, what would you do to avoid 20 years in jail.
United States v. Arroyo-Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137, 1147 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 913 (1978). Some courts, however, have indicated that such remarks "invite" the prosecutor to reply with otherwise improper remarks. See note 49 infra and accompanying text.
12. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit discussed the case law on
the admissibility of truthfulness agreements in United States v. Roberts, 618
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Once the agreement to testify truthfully is put before the jury,
the prosecution can incorporate a reference to it during the
13
closing argument.
Although useful for purposes of rehabilitating credibility, a
prosecutor's reference during summation to a witness's agreement to testify truthfully may exceed the limits of legitimate
argument if it constitutes improper "vouching"14 for the witness's credibility. Courts agree that it is improper for a prosecutor to vouch for the credibility of a government witness.'5
Vouching statements amount to unsworn testimony16 and infringe on the jury's role as factfinder by leading jurors to believe that credibility has been predetermined by the
7
government.'
Improper vouching occurs in three general forms. First, it
is improper for the prosecutor to express a personal opinion
as to the credibility of testimony presented during the trial.' 8
F.2d 530, 535-36 (9th Cir. 1980), and concluded that a "strong case" exists for the
exclusion of truthfulness agreements. Only three other federal courts have addressed the question. In United States v. Miceli, 446 F.2d 256, 261 (1st Cir. 1971),
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the admission of a truthfulness agreement was not plain error, although the opinion indicated that such a
promise could have been excluded with a proper defense objection. Neither
the Seventh Circuit nor the Second Circuit have objections to the use of truthfulness agreements. See United States v. Creamer, 555 F.2d 612, 617-18 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 833 (1977); United States v. Koss, 506 F.2d 1103, 1111,
1113 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911 (1975).
13. If the truthfulness agreement was never introduced into evidence, any
reference to the agreement during the closing argument is improper since it
would refer to evidence outside the record. See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
14. "Vouching" as used in this Note is the act of giving personal assurance
or supplying supporting testimony in attesting to the accuracy and truthfulness
of a witness's statement. See United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533 (9th
Cir. 1980).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Carleo, 576 F.2d 846, 851-52 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850
(1978); United States v. Ellis, 547 F.2d 863, 869 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Daniel, 422 F.2d 816, 817 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Murphy, 374 F.2d 651,
655 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 836 (1967); United States v. D'Antonio, 362
F.2d 151, 155 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 900 (1966); Greenberg v. United
States, 280 F.2d 472, 475 (1st Cir. 1960). Accord, McGhee v. State, 274 Ala. 373,
373, 149 So.2d 5, 6 (1963); People v. Pantages, 212 Cal. 237, 247, 297 P. 890, 895
(1931); East v. Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 46, 54, 60 S.W.2d 137, 140 (1933).
16. "To permit counsel to express his personal belief in the testimony
(even if not phrased so as to suggest knowledge of additional evidence not
known to the jury), would afford him a privilege not even accorded to witnesses
under oath and subject to cross-examination." Greenberg v. United States, 280
F.2d 472, 475 (1st Cir. 1960).
17. See Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 1969).
18. For example, in one case a prosecutor said, "Ifirmly believe what [the
police officers] said is the truth. I know it is the truth, and I expect you do,
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Second, it is improper for the prosecutor to place the prestige
of the government behind the witness's testimony, or to ask the
jury to rely on the prosecutor's own credibility in assessing the
veracity of someone he or she has put on the stand.' 9 Third, it
is improper for the prosecutor to refer to evidence that has not
been admitted during the trial and argue that the additional
facts lend support to the witness's testimony.20 All such statements are highly prejudicial 2 l and may deprive the defendant
of a fair trial by permitting the jurors to determine credibility
based on the prosecutor's assurances that the government
would not lie to them.22
Courts commonly use one of two tests to determine
whether or not a prosecutor has improperly vouched for the
credibility of a witness. One test, focusing on the prosecutor's
language itself, is objective: a prosecutor's remark will be held
improper only if the prosecutor actually says or insinuates that
a statement is based on matters within his or her personal
too." United States v. Lamerson, 457 F.2d 371, 372 (5th Cir. 1972) (emphasis in
original). See United States v. Gonzalez Vargas, 558 F.2d 631, 633 (1st Cir. 1977);
Gibson v. United States, 403 F.2d 569, 570 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1968); ABA CODE OF
DR 7-106(C)(4) [hereinafter cited as ABA
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBnr
CODE]; C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRnMINAL PROCEDURE § 525 (12th ed. 1975).
The prosecutor's statement, even though phrased to express a personal
opinion, may be proper, however, if the remark is based on the evidence
presented at the trial. An attorney "may argue, on his analysis of the evidence,
for any position or conclusion with respect to the [witness's credibility]." ABA
CODE, supra, DR 7-106(C) (4). See also C. TORCIA, supra, at § 525.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 755 (6th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor stated "you will find it is my job to call witnesses who know something
about the case."). See also United States v. Franklin, 568 F.2d 1156, 1158 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978).
20. Cf. Ginsberg v. United States, 257 F.2d 950, 954 (5th Cir. 1958) (the prosecutor stated: "I could probably have fifty people here who would show that
[the defendant] isn't a good character."); People v. Talle, 111 Cal. App. 2d 650,
673, 245 P.2d 633, 647 (1952) (prosecutor stated that the jury could go to his office after the trial so the jury could see information not presented during trial).
21. See United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 755 (6th Cir. 1979).
22. As one author has noted,
[t]here are several reasons for the rule, long established, that a lawyer
may not properly state his personal belief either to the court or to the
jury in the soundness of his case. In the first place, his personal belief
has no real bearing on the issue; no witness would be permitted so to
testify, even under oath, and subject to cross-examination, much less
the lawyer without either. Also, if expression of personal belief were
permitted, it would give an improper advantage to the older and better
known lawyer, whose opinion would carry more weight, and also with
the jury at least, an undue advantage to an unscrupulous one. Furthermore, if such were permitted, for counsel to omit to make such a positive assertion might be taken as an admission that he did not believe in
his case.
H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETmcs 147 (1953).
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knowledge or personal opinion. 23 In Lawn v. United States,24
the Supreme Court endorsed the use of an objective test, stating that a prosecutor's statement that "[w] e vouch for [the witnesses] because we think they are telling the truth"25 was
permissible because "[t] he Government's attorney did not say
nor insinuate that the statement was based on personal knowledge or on anything other than the testimony of those witnesses given before the jury."26
The other test, focusing on the jury's reasonable inferences
from the prosecutor's statements or insinuations, is subjective:
a prosecutor's remarks will be held improper if the jury could
reasonably believe that the prosecutor was indicating a personal belief in the witness's credibility, supporting the witness
with the government's credibility, or referring to outside knowledge. 27 The difference between the two tests is clear a remark
is proper under the objective test if it has any basis in the evidence, even if the jury could reasonably believe otherwise; a remark is proper under the subjective test only if the jury could
not have reasonably believed that the prosecutor referred to
improper facts, even if the remark had some basis in the evi29
most
dence.28 Although some courts have followed Lawn,
courts that have recently considered the issue have adopted
23. This standard apparently originated in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 85 (1934).
24. 355 U.S. 339 (1957).
25. Id. at 359-60 n.15.
26. Id. at 360 n.15. Although there were additional reasons for finding that
this remark did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial-the Court found that
the defense counsel had invited the prosecutor's reply with remarks of his own
and that the trial judge had instructed the jury that they should, carefully scrutinize the testimony of the accomplices-these reasons do not diminish the importance of the objective test. The Court simply focused on what was actually
said by the prosecutor and implied that the prosecutor's remarks would have
been proper even if they had not been invited by the defense or if an accomplice instruction had not been given. Id. No reasonable inferences that the
jury could draw from the statement or the prosecutor's insinuations were considered.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 537 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 756 (6th Cir. 1979); Gradsky v. United States,
373 F.2d 706, 710 (5th Cir. 1967).
28. "The adverse impact of personal expression of opinion is still present,
regardless of whether counsel purports to limit the basis of his opinion to the
facts at trial." United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 756 (6th Cir. 1979).
29. See United States v. Van Orden, 469 F.2d 461, 465 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 957 (1973); United States v. Greer, 467 F.2d 1064, 1072 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973); United States v. Browning, 390 F.2d 511,
514 (4th Cir. 1968); Ferina v. United States, 302 F.2d 95, 106 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 819 (1962).
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the subjective test.30
When a prosecutor tells a jury that a witness's truthfulness
agreement makes the witness more believable, the prosecutor
is making a statement that is functionally equivalent to vouching for the witness's credibility. The inferences that a jury may
reasonably draw from the prosecutor's reference to the truth-

fulness agreement directly correspond to statements that, if
made directly, would constitute impermissible vouching. It is
reasonable to expect that the jury will infer from the truthfulness agreement and the emphasis placed on it by the prosecutor that the prosecutor personally believes in the witness's
credibility. 3 ' The jury knows that the witness promised to testify truthfully, that the prosecutor offered the testimony for
their consideration, and that the prosecutor is giving the witness certain benefits in exchange for the testimony. Reference
to the truthfulness agreement also leads to the inference that
not only the prosecutor, but the "government" itself has verified the credibility of the witness. From the prosecutor's statement that the government is willing to treat the witness
leniently in return for truthful testimony at trial, the jury may
infer that the witness has been "compelled ... to come forward and be truthful," suggesting that the government "knows
what the truth is and is assuring its revelation." 32 Finally, the
30. See United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 537 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 756 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gonzalez Vargas, 558 F.2d 631, 633 (lst Cir. 1977); United States v. Ellis, 547 F.2d 863, 869 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Leeds, 457 F.2d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1972); Harris v.
United States, 402 F.2d 656, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
31. It might be argued that the jury could infer the prosecutor's belief in
the witness's credibility by the very fact that the defendant was brought to trial
and that the prosecutor called the witness to the stand. Any such inference,
however, is to some extent neutralized by the presumption of innocence. The
jury would only infer that the government had enough evidence to bring the
defendant to trial and that the prosecutor has reason to believe that the government witnesses are telling the truth, just as the jury might infer that the defense attorney has reasons to believe that the defense witnesses are telling the
truth.
32. United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 1980). It is improper
for the prosecutor to state explicitly that the government has verified the credibility of the witness. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. One prosecutor attempted to take advantage of the government's credibility in the following
manner.
[T]he government representatives don't put a witness on the stand unless there appears to be some credibility, until he appears to be a
truthful witness.
Certainly, the government has every opportunity to check out and
to judge the credibility and truthfulness of [the witnesses] in this case,
and in that context, we offered you their testimony.
Gradsky v. United States, 373 F.2d 706, 710 (5th Cir. 1967) (emphasis deleted).

1176

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:1169

prosecutor leaves the impression that there are facts outside of
the record that support the credibility of the witness; 33 the jury
can reasonably believe that the bargain would not have been
made had the prosecutor not been able to establish the accuracy of the witness's testimony. Statements from which the
jury may reasonably infer that the prosecutor is vouching
should be considered as improper as express statements of
vouching.
Prosecutorial use of truthfulness agreements to rehabilitate accomplices and other questionable witnesses improperly
shifts the jury's focus away from the credibility of the witness
to the credibility of the prosecutor and the government. This is
not only improper because it constitutes a form of vouching for
34
credibility but also because it is professionally questionable.
Prosecutors should not be permitted to circumvent the clear
impropriety of the usual forms of vouching by making the insinuations implicit in the use of truthfulness agreements. 35
Prosecutors do have alternative methods of rehabilitating a witness whose credibility is attacked through a plea or immunity
agreement, 3 6 and they should be forced to turn to those alternatives. Unfortunately, the current lack of judicial control over
even the usual vouching techniques offers prosecutors little incentive to abandon the truthfulness agreement-based credibility argument.
33. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
34. The Code of Professional Responsibility requires the prosecutor to act
with sound discretion, seeking justice, not merely convictions. See ABA CODE,
supra note 18, EC 7-13. See also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934);
ABA STANDARDS OF THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 1.1. The Code explicitly provides that a lawyer should not assert his or her personal opinion in a trial,
"[s]tate or allude to any matter ... that will not be supported by admissible
evidence," or "[a]ssert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue except
when testifying as a witness." See ABA CODE, supra note 18, DR 7-106(c) (4),
(1), (3).
35. Although Lawn v. United States did not consider improper implications, see 355 U.S. 339, 359-60 n.15 (1957), there is language in Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78 (1934), that disfavors "improper suggestions [and] insinuations." Id. at 88. See United States v. Dawkins, 562 F.2d 567, 569 (8th Cir. 1977)
(if prosecutor had implied that he had evidence not available to the jury, conduct would have been improper); United States v. Leeds, 457 F.2d 857, 861 (2d
Cir. 1972) (prosecutor did not imply that he had personal knowledge based on
matter extraneous to the record).
36. See notes 76-80 infra and accompanying text.
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I. OBSTACLES TO JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER
VOUCHING AND MISUSE OF TRUTHFULNESS
AGREEMENTS
Many courts have evinced a concern about the abuses of
prosecutorial vouching, and at least one court has specifically
concluded that the use of truthfulness agreements produces
similar results. 37 The courts have nevertheless failed to address the problem adequately. 38 Because they are contained
within clearly admissible plea or immunity agreements, 3 9
agreements to testify truthfully have been admitted into evidence without serious difficulty. 40 Once the agreements are admitted into evidence, prosecutors are able to exploit
truthfulness agreements in closing arguments. The use of
truthfulness agreements is permitted in objective vouching jurisdictions because the agreement itself is in evidence: the
prosecutor's remarks have some basis in the evidence and the
courts do not consider the jury's reasonable inferences from
the prosecutor's remarks.4 1 Although courts in subjective
vouching jurisdictions apply a broader test by examining the
jury's reasonable inferences from knowledge of a truthfulness
agreement,4 they generally have not taken the next logical step
of concluding that improper vouching has occurred. As one
such court stated in its analysis of personal opinion arguments,
an "expression of personal belief may be tolerated if it is based
solely on the evidence introduced and the jury is not led to believe that other evidence, unavailable to them, justified the be37. See United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 1980).
38. Other sanctions might be directed at the prosecutor. First, there is discipline by the legal profession if the prosecutor has violated a disciplinary rule.
See note 34 upra. Although instances of prosecutorial misconduct are documented repeatedly in appellate opinions, bar associations have "rarely invoked
[disciplinary proceedings] as a corrective for courtroom misconduct by prosecutors." Alschuler, supra note 6, at 670-71 (footnotes omitted). Secondly, prosecutors could be cited for contempt when they are guilty of courtroom
misconduct. 'This sanction can be easily and quickly administered, and it permits substantial flexibility in adjusting penalties to reflect the severity of the
prosecutor's misconduct. The authorized penalties range from suspended
sentences and token fines to larger fines, jail terms, and indefinite suspension
from the practice of law." Id. at 673. Alschuler found that this remedy is also
rarely used. Id. at 674. But see United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 198 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1980) (the court announced that it is now prepared to cite prosecutors for
improperly vouching for their witnesses).
39. See notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text.
40. The few appellate courts that have considered the admissibility of
agreements to testify truthfully have not conclusively resolved the issue. See
note 12 supra.
41. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
42. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
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lief."43 Such an analysis frequently results in a finding that the

prosecutorial remarks are "questionable," but not improper.44
Thus, most courts do not reach the question of whether the failure of the trial court to prohibit the use of the truthfulness
agreement in closing argument is prejudicial error.
A determination that any particular prosecutorial comment
is improper does not necessarily mean that the case will be reversed on appeal; the harmless error doctrine 45 permits courts
to affirm convictions despite "outrageous" prosecutorial conduct that is "unethical, highly reprehensible, and merits unqualified condemnation." 46 Several factors may cause an
appellate court to conclude that an otherwise prejudicial remark is nonetheless harmless error. First, the court may find
that overwhelming evidence of guilt would have made it difficult for the jury to acquit even in the absence of the error.47
Second, the court may find that the error was harmless because
46
the defense did not object at the time the remark was made.
43. United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1243 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 108 (1980) (emphasis added). See United States v. Martinez, 466
F.2d 679, 683 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1065 (1973); Henderson v.
United States, 218 F.2d 14, 19 (6th Cir. 1955).
44. One court, for example, approved a statement in which the prosecutor
said that he did not "hesitate for a moment standing by the testimony" of the
witness and that the testimony "rang of truth." United States v. Dawkins, 562
F.2d 567, 569 (8th Cir. 1977). The court noted: "Arguably this statement is open
to the charge that it expresses the prosecutor's personal opinion concerning the
believability of [the witness]," but nevertheless went on to approve of the
statement. Id. A court following the lead of the Sixth Circuit would find this
type of comment improper, however, on the ground that personal belief arguments are improper, even when they are based solely on the evidence
presented at trial. See United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 756 (6th Cir. 1979).
45. FED. R. Crm. P. 52(a) provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." See
United States v. Handly, 591 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1244 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 108 (1980);
United States v. Spain, 536 F.2d 170, 176 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833
(1976).
46. Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533, 543 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312
U.S. 692 (1941), quoted in Alschuler, supra note 6, at 659.
47. See United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1244 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 108 (1980); United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1042 (3rd
Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 1040 (1980); People v. Mariable, 58 A.D.2d
877, 878, 396 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (1977). In cases in which the evidence of guilt is
not overwhelming, the same error may be prejudicial and "may carry 'much
weight against the accused when they should properly carry none."' United
States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F.2d 637, 642 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
48. See United States v. Franklin, 568 F.2d 1156, 1159 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 955 (1978). The rationale may be that if the remark was prejudicial, the
defense would have objected at the time. See United States v. ArteagaLimones, 529 F.2d 1183, 1190 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); United
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Third, the "invited error" doctrine may apply: the prosecutor's
remark may be held justifiable as a response to comments from
the defense counsel.4 9 Finally, the trial judge's curative instructions to the jury may be found to have neutralized the
otherwise prejudicial statement.5 0
Courts have thus far had little difficulty excusing the use of
truthfulness agreements under the harmless error doctrine
even if their use could have been considered improper. In
United States v. Koss,51 for example, the court reasoned that
the use of the truthfulness agreement was permissible because
2
the defense attorney had challenged the witness's credibility.5
53
Likewise, in United States v. Aloi, the court noted that the effects of the agreement were moderated by the defendant's
counsel, who had challenged the veracity of the government
witnesses day after day.54 The result is that prosecutors are
able to make highly questionable statements without having to
worry about a reversal; their greatest worry may be that of receiving caustic comments from appellate judges. 55
Judicial reluctance to insist upon a universal requirement
of reversal even when vouching or other prosecutorial misconduct is found to be prejudicial to a defendant's case is the final
States v. Johnson, 331 F.2d 281, 282 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 905 (1964);
Manion v. State, 339 So. 2d 147, 150 (Ala. Ct. App. 1976). But see FED. R. CRni.
P. 52(b): "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
49. The rationale for this rule is that since the defense counsel "asked" for
the comment, he or she is in no position to object later. See United States v.
Milne, 498 F.2d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975); United
States v. Hoskins, 446 F.2d 564, 565 (9th Cir. 1971); People v. Bolton, 35 Ill. App.
3d 965, 973, 343 N.E.2d 190, 197 (1976); Johnson & Southard, ProsecutorialMisconduct in Closing Argument: Does Harmless ErrorMean Never Having to Say
"Reversed?", 49 J. KANSAS B.A. 205, 224 (1980).
50. See United States v. Handly, 591 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Daniel, 422 F.2d 816, 817 (6th Cir. 1970); Keeble v. United States, 347
F.2d 951, 956 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 940 (1965). But see People v.
Pantages, 212 Cal. 237, 249, 297 P. 890, 895 (1931) (exception to the general rule
when the misconduct is such that it is reasonably clear that its harmful effects
cannot be obviated or remedied by an instruction); People v. Wright, 17 A.D.2d
151, 153, 232 N.Y.S.2d 767, 769 (1962) (prejudice flowing from prosecutor's statement could not be cured by trial court's instruction), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 938
(1964).
51. 506 F.2d 1103 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911 (1975).
52. Id. at 1112-13.
53. 511 F.2d 585 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975).
54. Id. at 598.
55. See note 59 infra and accompanying text. "It is the harmless error doctrine that, more than any other procedural rule, accounts for the relative ineffectiveness of appellate review in controlling prosecutorial misconduct today."
Alschuler, supra note 6, at 659.
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obstacle to the effective control of the misuse of truthfulness
agreements. Courts have tended to analyze cases individually;5 6 new trials have been ordered only when, in light of the
entire record,5 7 "egregious" prosecutorial errors have "irreparably prejudiced the defendant." 58 Courts have preferred to
threaten future reversals rather than to order new trials. As
the constant stream of warnings from the appellate courts
clearly demonstrates, however, such threats are ineffective. 5 9 A
warning accompanied by an affirmed conviction has no effect
on the particular case under review and the prosecutor has no
motivation to change his or her behavior in a future case. Until
the courts recognize that mere warnings are futile,60 vouching
61
will continue unabated.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 756 (6th Cir. 1979).
57. See United States v. Dawkins, 562 F.2d 567, 568-69 (8th Cir. 1977).
58. United States v. Carleo, 576 F.2d 846, 851-52 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 850 (1978). Apparently, the feeling is that a per se rule would be too inflexible; courts do not want to reverse convictions, despite prosecutorial misconduct, when one or more of the harmless error factors are present.
59. In United States v. Spain, 536 F.2d 170 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
833 (1976), for example, the court warned:
The records before us recently have too often disclosed prosecutorial
arguments which, while not rising to the level of plain error, were nevertheless improper. If this continues, this court may find it necessary
in appropriate cases to exercise its supervisory authority, even in the
absence of plain error. In the future all federal prosecutors in this circuit will confirm [sic] their arguments to the standards set by the
Supreme Court in the Berger case.
536 F.2d at 176 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1934)). The same
court, however, was forced to repeat its warning the following year, this time
threatening that "the prosecution will face the substantial risk of having a conviction set aside." United States v. Hollinger, 553 F.2d 535, 548 (7th Cir. 1977).
Another court referred to its "constant admonitions" against prosecutors expressing their personal opinions. United States v. Gonzalez Vargas, 558 F.2d
631, 633 (1st Cir. 1977). A third noted that "improper statements in summation
is a continuous problem in this Court in civil and criminal jury trials." United
States v. Handly, 591 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1979).
60. The Ninth Circuit recently recognized the futility of its warnings:
"Continuing to issue admonitions serves little purpose if we affirm convictions
in criminal cases while tolerating prosecutors who lack judgment, common
sense and knowledge of appropriate courtroom conduct and permissible argument." United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 198-99 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980).
61. Only the Ninth Circuit appears to be ready to adopt a rule forbidding
the introduction and use of agreements to testify truthfully. See United States
v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 1980). Although the court did not say that
use of truthfulness agreements would be per se reversible error, Roberts can be
interpreted to mean that their improper use would be reversible error when the
court is "not persuaded that the jury would have convicted the defendants had
it not been exposed to improper argument." Id. at 535.
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IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The tone of appellate court warnings 62 indicates that courts
would welcome a solution to the problem of prosecutorial
vouching. An effective solution, however, must recognize the
legitimate need of the prosecutor to rehabilitate a witness's
credibility through persuasive argument to the jury. The prosecutor should not be forced into a position in which his or her
only function is to deliver a dry recitation of the evidence"[to shear [the prosecutor] of all oratorical emphasis, while
leaving wide latitude to the defense, is to load the scales of justice." 63 Courts are unlikely, therefore, to alter their present
level of discretionary control over the general forms of vouching.64 Unlike many forms of prosecutorial misconduct, however, truthfulness agreements are used as a vouching device
only in a particular trial context,65 and as such are subject to
the strictures of the law of evidence.
A witness's agreement to testify truthfully is offered because of its purported relevance 66 to the issue of the witness's
credibility.67 Because the witness is already required to take
an oath or affirmation at trial, however, the probative value of
the truthfulness agreement is minimal. 68 The jury determines
the witness's credibility based on the testimony given under
this oath, not on statements sworn to before the trial.69 Moreover, the prejudicial impact of the truthfulness agreement, and
the possibility that the jury will use it improperly, outweigh
7
whatever legitimate value it might have. As has been shown, 0
a jury might reasonably infer from a credibility argument based
on the truthfulness agreement that the prosecutor believes the
witness is telling the truth, that the government has verified
62. See note 59 supra.
63. Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925), quoted in
United States v. Spain, 536 F.2d 170, 174 (7th Cir. 1976).
64. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text.
66. Relevant evidence is evidence having a tendency to make a fact more
or less probable. See FED. R. EvrD. 401. Relevant evidence can be excluded,
however, when its probative value is substantially outweighed by a risk of undue prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. See FED. R. Evin. 403. Rule 403 thus
permits a balancing process to determine the admissibility of credibility evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 1980).
67. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
68. The oath is not merely symbolic; it impresses upon the witness the necessity of telling the truth. See C. McCoRMic, supra note 10, at 582.
69. Prosecutorial comments should add "nothing of substance to the credibility of a witness who in all events has sworn to tell the truth." United States
v. Dawkins, 562 F.2d 567, 569 (8th Cir. 1977).
70. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
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the witness's credibility, and that there is outside evidence that
supports the witness's testimony. Indeed, the prosecutor is
likely to encourage the jury to draw these inferences. 7 1 This
prejudicial impact is sufficient to exclude the truthfulness
agreement in subjective vouching jurisdictions. 72 Because the
use of the truthfulness agreement is the functional equivalent
of making express improper statements to the jury, the agree73
ment should be excluded in objective jurisdictions as well.
Therefore, an application of the balancing test used under Federal Rule of Evidence 40374 requires truthfulness agreements to
be excluded from the evidence because their minimal probative
value is outweighed by a disproportionate risk of undue
prejudice.
The use of truthfulness agreements can also be eliminated
because there are legitimate, effective alternatives available to
the prosecutor in arguing credibility to the jury.75 The prosecutor can point out that the witness took an oath and that if the
witness lies in court, he or she can be prosecuted for perjury.7 6
Such a statement would shift the emphasis from the truthfulness agreement to the oath taken before the testimony was
given at trial.7 7 The prosecutor can also explain to the jury why
the government finds it necessary to use an accomplice or any
other culpable person as a witness.7 8 Jury members might thus
71. During closing arguments, counsel are permitted to draw inferences
favorable to their position as long as the inferences are based on the evidence
presented at trial. See Borgia v. United States, 78 F.2d 550, 554 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 615 (1935).
72. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
74. See note 66 supra. This part of an otherwise admissible plea or immunity agreement may be excluded simply by removing the improper material
from the rest of the document. In United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th
Cir. 1980), the court cited a case in which part of a plea agreement was excluded. Id. at 535. In United States v. Arroyo-Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978), the plea agreement referred to the fact that the
witness's family was in protective custody; such material was properly deleted
from the plea agreement because it was irrelevant and prejudicial. Id. at 1145.
75. The availability of non-prejudicial evidence is a consideration included
in the balancing test allowed by Federal Rule 403. As the Advisory Committee's Notes to that rule state: 'The availability of other means of proof may
also be an appropriate factor."
76. See United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264, 274 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 905 (1977).
77. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 534 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980)
("We suggest that [the prosecutor] might appropriately explain to the jury the
necessity of using unsavory witnesses."). The prosecutor might point out, for
example, that accomplices are the only parties who would have sufficient information to incriminate the defendant, that no other people have knowledge of
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understand that there may be no other way to obtain evidence
to incriminate the defendant.7 9 The prosecutor can also bring
to the jury's attention the witness's demeanor and manner of
speaking during the trial. 80 Finally, the prosecutor can suggest
that because the witness has already admitted his or her guilt
and has pled guilty or has been given immunity from prosecution, the witness has nothing to gain from lying in court. Instead of stating that the witness came to court to tell the truth,
the prosecutor could say that the witness came to tell his or her
version of the facts-what the witness thinks the truth is. All
of these alternatives shift the jury's attention away from the
credibility of the prosecutor and the government and toward
assessing whether or not the witness is worthy of credibility
when standing alone.
'An exclusionary rule for truthfulness agreements is completely consistent with the subjective vouching test used by
most courts today; furthermore, appellate courts should welcome a solution that operates at the trial level to prevent at
least some vouching problems from reaching them. Excluding
truthfulness agreements would lead courts that use the subjective vouching test to a conclusion already implicit in the subjective vouching theory; the prejudicial impact of the truthfulness
agreement arises when jurors draw inferences from the knowledge that such an agreement is part of the plea or immunity
"deal" with the government.8 1 An exclusionary rule, however,
would not be consistent with the objective test; the courts that
apply this test do not consider remarks improper when the jury
can draw reasonable inferences of vouching from otherwise
proper arguments. 82 Nevertheless, it is difficult to justify the
continued use of the objective test; the distinction between actually stating something improperly to the jury or implying it is
plainly artificial-the jury will reach the same conclusions in eithe conspiracy, and that without the accomplice's testimony, the defendant
would go unpunished.
79. See Nemerson, supra note 1, at 729 n.183. "This is particularly true in
prosecutions of high level drug dealers and organized crime figures-prosecutions in which incriminating evidence may be available only from others lower
down in the criminal hierarchy." Id.
80. Prosecutors may refer "to the witness's manner of testimony in court
before the jury. Such description of testimony does not constitute error for it
neither puts the prosecutor's own credibility before the jury nor does it carry
any inference of outside knowledge." United States v. Dawkins, 562 F.2d 567,
569 (8th Cir. 1977).
81. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text.
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ther case. 83 The objective test should also be rejected because
it is based on an unsound understanding of the common law
rule that counsel could not impeach their own witnesses.8 4 Recent changes in evidence rules that allow counsel to impeach
their own witnesses 85 render the Court's understanding in
83. See United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 756 (6th Cir. 1979). The prosecutor's arguments
should be prohibited for the same reasons that explicit statements of this nature are prohibited. As the Supreme Court stated in Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78 (1935), "[JI]mproper suggestions, insinuations and especially assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused
when they should properly carry none." Id. at 88.
84. The Lawn rule is apparently based on an unsound understanding of
the common law advanced by the government in the case. The government
contended that "[t]here was no suggestion in [the prosecutor's] remarks that
he was basing his conclusion on facts outside the record before the jury or that
he had independent knowledge of petitioner's guilt." Brief for the United
States at 52-53. During closing arguments, the prosecutor said:
I vouch for Lubben. The Government put Lubben on the stand because it thought that Lubben could be vouched for.
I vouch for Roth also....
I vouch for them (and I will explain precisely why I do in just a
moment, but I vouch for them[) 1. When I say "I," I am referring to the
District Attorney's office and I merely represent them. We vouch for
them because we think they are telling the truth.
Record, vol. 3, at 2587-2588. The government argued that the remarks were unobjectionable under "the general common law rule that the party who puts on a
witness, 'under familiar rules of evidence, vouches for his credibility."' Brief
for the United States at 52 (quoting Bowles v. Marx Hide & Tallow Co., 153 F.2d
146, 147 (6th Cir. 1946)). The government also contended that the "'affirmation
of belief [in the witness] merely put into words what the very fact of prosecution implied."' Id. at 52 (citing United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155
F.2d 631, 637 (2d Cir. 1946)). Lawn contended that under the common law,
vouching for witness credibility meant only that the prosecutor could not impeach his or her own witness-the rule was not meant to allow prosecutors to
testify to witness credibility. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 11.
The Court rejected Lawn's arguments and adopted a standard that was almost identical to the government proposal. The Court may have been persuaded by the government's contention that vouching in this manner was
allowed by the common law. Neither of the cases cited by the government in
Lawn, however, offered strong support for the propriety of the prosecutor's
comments in that case. Bowles was a civil action; even if counsel is allowed to
vouch for witnesses in that setting, the rule may not be appropriate for a criminal trial. The Antonelli court also offered no explanation for its statement that
the fact of prosecution implies an affirmation of belief, but relied on a case condoning improper prosecutorial comment because of the overwhelming evidence
of defendant's guilt. See Meyer v. United States, 258 F. 212, 215 (7th Cir. 1919).
Although the government was correct in stating that the common law requires counsel to "vouch" for his or her witness, Lawn's explanation of that
rule was correct: that a party vouches for the credibility of his or her witnesses
means only that counsel cannot impeach his or her own witness. See People v.
Wright, 17 A.D.2d 151, 153, 232 N.Y.S.2d 767, 768-69 (1962) ('"The rule does not
contemplate that a district attorney may by reason of his official position and
personal knowledge of the facts certify that the witness is telling the truth.").
85. See FED. R. Evm. 607 & Advisory Committee Note.
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Lawn not only unsound, but outdated.
Once the rule excluding truthfulness agreements has been
adopted, appellate courts must apply the rule by reversing a
conviction should the trial court commit error in allowing the
agreement to be introduced or in allowing the prosecutor to refer to its terms in summation. Reference to a truthfulness
agreement in a closing argument when the agreement has specifically been excised from the evidence is an improper reference to matters outside the evidentiary record and is a clear
ground for reversal and a new trial order.86 Moreover, courts
should also find that closing arguments based on improperly
admitted truthfulness agreements constitute improper vouching and deprive the defendant of a fair trial, and therefore also
constitute reversible error.87 Such a rule of reversal is the only
way to prevent future misconduct that might otherwise be labeled "harmless;" it will deter prosecutors from using truthfulness agreements at trial because they will know that trial court
acceptance will be error and will result in reversal on appeal. 88
Because the truthfulness agreement adds little to the issue of
credibility89 and creates such a large potential for abuse,90 the
initial expense of new trials is justified in view of the harmful
effects that will be eliminated.
V. CONCLUSION
One might ask whether it will make any difference if the
prosecutor is not allowed to enhance witness credibility with
the use of a truthfulness agreement; jurors probably realize
that the government believes that the witnesses it puts on the
stand will aid the prosecution. Clearly jurors may properly entertain their own inferences from the government's actions. A
juror might base a credibility decision on the wrong factors,
however, when the prosecutor, with the court's blessing, tells
the jury that a witness promised that he or she would come to
court and tell the truth at the risk of the bargain, and that because the witness has told the truth, he or she will not be punished as severely as he or she otherwise would have been.91
86. See United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1980).
87. The unfair trial is the result of a reference to inadmissible evidence.
See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
88. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
89. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
90. See generally United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1980).
91. The United States Supreme Court exercised its powers in formulating
such a rule excluding prosecutor testimony on matters having a similar poten-
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The beneficial effect of any change in trial procedures-including the exclusion of truthfulness agreements-should not
be measured by the number of acquittals that might otherwise
have been convictions. Rather, the purpose of the exclusionary
rule proposed in this Note is to sanitize criminal trials by eliminating misleading and improper prosecutorial influence on the
jury. Adoption of the proposed rule would allow juries to base
their decisions on what they see and hear in the courtroom and
not on the testimonial actions of counsel.

tial to mislead jurors in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). In Gijffln, the
Court concluded that it was a violation of the self-incrimination clause of the
constitution for a prosecutor or a court to comment on the defendant's failure
to testify. Id. at 615. Thus convictions will be reversed because of the prohibited prosecutorial comments, even if there is overwhelming evidence of guilt. A
similar rule, although not necessarily of a constitutional dimension, should be
adopted in the context of prosecutorial vouching via truthfulness agreements,
stating that prosecutorial vouching, and the use of the truthfulness agreement
to achieve that result, is a denial of a fair trial.

